SABURO OKITA was born on November 3, 1914 in Dairen, Liaoning Province, one of the three northeastern provinces of China known as Manchuria. Pare of China but under Russian control, Dairen had been developed first by Russia as a seaport and the terminus of the Siberian railroad. It had been ceded to Japan at the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and was technically leased from China.

SABURO came from the rising modernized industrial class. His father, Shuji Okita, was President of Ryoto-Shimpo, a newspaper published in Dairen, and after moving to Tokyo in 1928, he starred a carburetor manufacturing company. His mother, Hanako Okita, gave birth to three sons, SABURO being the youngest.

SABURO’s early schooling was in Dairen at the Ohiroba Primary School. In 1927 he left for Japan to attend Tokyo Furitsu Daiichi (Middle School) and later Daiichi Koto Gakko (First High School) from which he graduated in 1934. He entered Tokyo Imperial University the same year and received his degree in electrical engineering from that institution in 1937.

After joining the Ministry of Post in 1937 he was sent by the government to then Japanese-occupied Peking as an electrical engineer, and spent three years, 1939 to 1941, there. In 1941 he returned to Tokyo and worked as a research staff member of the Ministry of Greater East Asia. He became interested in economic planning while analyzing possibilities for the development of power resources and industrial development in occupied China.

OKITA spent the early years of the postwar Allied Occupation of Japan in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a staff member of the Research Bureau he was involved in three studies made by the Foreign Office between 1945 and 1947 which had as their purpose, he said, "explaining Japan’s need to maintain an economy of peace and defending Japan's position against the possible severe reparations payments."

OKITA left the Foreign Office in April 1947, presenting his resignation to Prime Minister Yoshida with whom he disagreed on how to promote the priority production system. Two months later he joined the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB), established on the recommendation of the Occupation Government and became Chief of Research, involved with analyzing Japanese domestic economy and foreign trade possibilities. He participated in preparation of Japan's "Economic Rehabilitation Plan 1949-53," which, though not formally adopted due to political changes, was the basis of the postwar economic recovery and at the same time served as a background paper for requesting aid from the United States. (Over the next few years Japan received US$2 billion.)

In 1950 OKITA was sent by the ESB on a 23-nation tour to study economic analysis in America, Europe and Asia. The following year—the first time Japan was allowed to attend—he was sent as an observer to the 7th Meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) held in Lahore, Pakistan. In 1952, after the signing of the Treaty of Peace with most Allied nations, Japan was permitted to participate in ECAFE and OKITA became the first Japanese appointed to the Secretariat. He served in Bangkok on the ECAFE staff 1952-53 as Chief of the Economic Analysis Section.

OKITA continued to be involved with ECAFE over the next two decades. He attended the conferences as Japanese delegate from 1952 to 1954 and in 1955 he was instrumental in arranging the 11th session which was held in Tokyo, March 28th to April 7th. The largest international gathering until that time in postwar Japan, the assembly drew 200 representatives from 21 member and 3 associate member states. The purpose of the session was broad. It was, as OKITA wrote," to provide a common ground for general discussions which may lead to basic ideas upon which the governments of participating nations might formulate their own economic policies covering a multitude of special fields."

With his previous experiences in analyzing Japan's economy, and his more recent experiences living and traveling in Southeast Asia and dealing with problems of that region, OKITA was the first of the postwar generation of Japanese economists to concern himself publicly with Japan's relationship with the area on non-exploitive mutually beneficial terms. In "South and Southeast Asia and Japanese Economy," written in 1954 for Japan Quarterly, he pointed out that Japan needs raw materials and many of them are obtainable from South and Southeast Asia. Japan is not self-sufficient in foodstuffs and has been importing rice from Pakistan, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia; sugar from Indonesia; and copra, which furnishes cooking oil, from Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. Petroleum, essential to industrial growth, has been imported from Indonesia, iron ore from Malaysia and the Philippines and coking coal from India.

Not only is Japan dependent on the import of raw materials from the developing countries of Southeast Asia, these countries are equally or even more dependent on the export of their resources to Japan. Raw material exports in 1954 produced one-half of their governmental revenues. Prices of these commodities fluctuate widely depending on external world conditions. Japan, OKITA suggested, "should be able to contribute substantially toward stabilization of the economies of Southeast Asia by offering long-term contracts for rice purchases and other transactions." In the long run, he added, "such action on the part of Japan will redound to her own benefit."

OKITA noted that basic to the solution of the problems of the developing countries were: 1) acquisition of adequate capital, 2) improvement in efficiency of investment, i.e., investing in the potentially most productive sector of the economy and 3) mobilization of their vast labor pool. Japan was not in the position to help much with capital acquisition except through continued reparations payments; major monetary contributions, he felt, must come from the West. Japan could, however, offer technical assistance since it had been dealing with the same problems these nations were faced with: overpopulation, poverty and undercapitalization.

In 1956 he reiterated in Asian Affairs that the overriding need of the developing countries of Asia was to accumulate capital. Private savings and taxation, he felt, were not capable of producing greater returns without unacceptable hardship. The answer, he suggested, was to utilize the labor surplus (farmers in Burma and Thailand, he stated, work only 70 days a year) on infrastructure needs, thereby acquiring non-monetary capital investment. He called upon international lending institutions to show more concern for Southeast Asia, pointing out that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), as of June 1954, had devoted only seven percent of its resources to Southeast Asia. Aid from the United States and from the Colombo Plan also, he found "not too impressive."

He reiterated that the developing nations themselves must resolve which sector of the economy to invest in, but pointed out that India's investment in heavy industry was not doing too well. Last, but not least, he promoted the notion that the countries of South and Southeast Asia develop their economies on a regional basis, complementing rather than competing with their neighbors.

In 1956 OKITA was named Director of the Planning Bureau of Japan's Economic Planning Agency (EPA). EPA's main functions were analysis of economic factors, coordination of economic policies of various ministries and long-range projection and planning for economic needs.

An outgrowth of the Economic Stabilization Board, EPA was a new government unit, just under ministerial level but with responsibilities cutting across the traditional ministries; its director general had cabinet status. EPA was set up to handle all technical work associated with economic planning. It had great potential influence on the power structure but, as one commentator said, "In practically no administrative matters can the Economic Planning Agency exercise an independent initiative or power of coordination. It is like an assembly plant which has to make a facade of coordinated harmony out of parts supplied by others beyond its control In spite of these shortcomings it was to become a major element in Japanese economic planning and OKITA was to play a major role in its deliberations

In late 1962 OKITA became Director of EPA's Development Bureau. A foreign observer commenced, "This is a recognition not only of his integrity and ability but the respect the politicians have for him. In this position he has to withstand the strongest pressures as each politician wants his [geographical] area to be recommended for development." Recognizing that it is difficult to determine the effect an individual has on Japanese governmental decision-making—since Japanese ministries and businesses consult both vertically and horizontally and decisions are arrived at by consensus—another foreign commentator seated: "It is safe to say that Mr. OKITA, in his present position which is the highest that a career civil servant can go. . .exerts an important influence in the economic development of this country, and his recommendations are paid attention to in cabinet meetings."

OKITA helped draft the first economic plan to be officially adopted, the "Five Year Plan for Economic Self-Support, 1955," whose goals were attained so quickly that an updated plan was submitted by the EPA in 1957. He was intimately involved in formulating the "Plan for Doubling National Income 1961-70," adopted in 1960, and the "Comprehensive National Development Plan," approved in 1961. The latter was designed to create new industrial sites from Sapporo on Hokkaido, to Fukuoka on Kyushu, but away from the "overheated" megalopolises of Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka.

Commenting in the prestigious American journal Foreign Affairs on the Planning Bureau report, "Prospect of Japanese Economy in 1980," which was the basis of these plans, OKITA pointed out that because of population growth, rising numbers can be expected to enter the labor market until the 1970s. This, however, will change and Japan will enter the 1980s as a labor-short economy. The "dual economy"—to be found in many of the developing countries of the world but not in the industrialized West nor in communist states, both of which have a unified wage scale—has been advantageous to Japanese growth. Modern and premodern sectors exist side by side in the economy, the former consisting primarily of new, large scale, technical industries, the latter of agriculture and small enterprises. A large gap in wage, price and productivity separates the two sectors. The modern sector is capital intensive with high productivity, high wages and high prices. The premodern sector is labor-intensive and suffers from low productivity, low wages and low prices. Goods from the modern sector (steel, fertilizer) tend to flow to the low-income markets of Southeast Asia and other developing areas; premodern, high-labor goods sell in the high-income markets of the industrialized West. These markets, however, OKITA noted, will change as other developing countries enter labor-intensive manufacturing, and Japan must be ready to adapt her economy to this new competition.

One of the goals of the Income Doubling Plan was to absorb less productive labor into the high productive sector of the economy, thereby gradually eliminating the dual economy and integrating all into the higher wage/productivity sector. Proposals were to increase government spending on infrastructure (roads, harbors, water supply), promote the growth of heavy and technical industries, and increase exports 10 percent annually. In connection with the latter OKITA proposed that economic and technical assistance should be proffered the less developed nations to enable them to afford imports by developing their own exports. The economic growth target of the Plan was "over-achieved" and a new "Medium Term Economic Plan" was designed by the Planning Bureau in 1964.

During the early 1960s OKITA wrote extensively for both the Japanese and the English speaking publics, explaining Japan's development and discussing the framework for Japanese-Asian relations. In articles published in 1962 and 1963 he traced the reasons for Japan's extraordinary postwar growth which, between 1951 and 1960, averaged 9.6 percent compared with its prewar (1926-1939) growth rate of 4.6 percent. Japan had been able to turn to her advantage factors which were previously considered a disadvantage—lack of raw materials, overpopulation and un- and underemployment. By buying raw materials where cheapest and shipping them by sea in new, larger ships direct to factories built at dockside, Japan was able to take advantage of lower labor costs elsewhere, low sea rates for bulk transportation, and her own surplus labor to manufacture for internal and export markets. Both segments of her dual economy benefited.

However, the economic advantage enjoyed by the pre-modern segment of the economy, OKITA cautioned again, was sure to disappear as the developing countries of Asia, with a greater labor surplus then Japan—and consequently lower wages—move into labor-intensive manufacturing. Not only will they replace Japan in the international market, he wrote, but they will compete directly with Japanese industries at home. Japan must be ready to adapt to these changes and welcome them because, only by exporting labor-intensive manufactures to Japan can the other Asian countries import capital-intensive goods from Japan. And it is in Japan's self interest to modernize and expand the capital-intensive segment of her society. OKITA reiterated that Japan should offer technical assistance and know-how to help Asian nations develop both labor-intensive manufacturing and raw material processing.

In 1962, as Director of the Planning Bureau, he headed the Economic Survey Mission to Rangoon to explore how Japan could best contribute to the development of Burma, a country he had first visited in 1951. In 1963 he wrote in Jitsugyo No Nippon, "Economic problems, as compared with the prewar days, have assumed marked internationalism." Today, "each nation is thus required to cooperate with one another and take such measures as will improve one another's economy. Now that a [purely] self-interested policy is certain to boomerang, measures must be self-interested and altruistic as well. The tendency toward internationalization of economic problems will be enhanced as the international exchange increases and international traffic and communication develop."

Japanese business and government were not quick to see the logic of his ideas. Prominent politicians were still commenting, "You have to trade with rich men, you can't trade with beggars." In 1966, writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review, OKITA said: "The present reluctance to allow free imports of primary products and of labor-intensive manufactures will gradually decrease; this will happen as scarcity of manpower and rising wage levels cause both capital and labor to shift from low to high productivity sectors of the Japanese economy."

OKITA was fully aware that the West noted Japan's economic growth with some misgivings. In December 1962, as Chief of the Development Bureau, he discussed British and American reactions with his colleagues. Sir Norman Kipping, Managing Director of the Federation of British Industries, had headed a study mission to Japan. While praising Japanese economic growth, his report criticized Japan's limited "liberalization" of imports, stating that such liberalization was still very selective and uneconomic for the countries whose products had been "liberalized." For example, Japan was now permitting the import of cocoa, but only in tins of one pound or more, although Japanese households usually purchased cocoa in quarter pound tins; the import of fully-assembled trucks was now liberalized, but not the "knocked down" components which are much more economical to transport.

Kipping also criticized "aided competition," i.e., government-assisted and monopolistic associations of trading firms. He said that Japan has traditionally been protectionist and imports only what it doesn't itself produce. Peter Drucker, well known American management expert and frequent consultant in Japan, went even further. In 1963 he wrote, "Japan is thoroughly mercantilist, and has successfully combined aggressive competition abroad with protectionism and imposed rice stability at home."

In response to these criticisms OKITA pointed out to Japanese business that it must buy more from the undeveloped countries of Asia and Africa so that it can increase its exports to them. He added: "Since Japan is surrounded with underdeveloped countries in Asia, it must extend aid to them. Both the Government and private circles must tackle in earnest how to improve the world economy as well as the Japanese economy."

In November 1963 SABURO OKITA suddenly resigned from the EPA. His position as both administrator and economist had been a delicate one, and the fact that EPA cut across, but had no direct power over, competing government ministries meant that EPA decisions were subject to strong political pressures and discontent. (As he commented at one point, a plan is but the "equitable distribution of dissatisfaction.") Moreover, politics included a struggle between the economists of the EPA and the entrenched bureaucrats of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The economists OKITA brought into government with him had hoped he would become Vice-Minister of the Agency but, according to the Economist, if he was to become such "he must have 'politics' and even allow himself to be covered by world 'mud.' " Instead he resigned.

In 1964 OKITA joined the newly formed nongovernmental Japan Economic Research Center as President. The purpose of the organization is "1) doing research on domestic and international problems, 2) convening of international conferences, 3) convening of seminars and lectures, 4) training of journalists and company staff, 5) library and information services, and 6) subsidizing group and individual studies on important economic issues." The Center has been engaged in such specific projects as examining the suitability of export industries for developing countries and studying the relationship of agricultural development projects to infrastructure and agroindustry. It is looking at the problems of urban growth in Asia by the year 2000, the transfer of technology to small and medium businesses, and the development of raw material processing industries in developing countries. Although its main emphasis is on South and Southeast Asia, the Center is also analyzing the problems involved in extending aid to Africa and Latin America.

Writing in 1969, as President of the Research Center, for the Second Japanese-American Assembly in Shimoda, OKITA pointed out that all noncommunist, or free market, countries in Asia depend upon Japan as a market for their exports. Exports to Japan account for 28.7 percent of South Korea's total exports, 27.5 percent of Taiwan's, 38.8 percent of the Philippines', 22.1 percent of Thailand's and 25.9 percent of Indonesia's. Moreover the total percent of imports of Japanese goods by these countries is expected to rise from 18.5 percent of their total imports in 1966 to over 30 percent in 1975. It is therefore important for these countries to know the projected growth and growth areas of the Japanese economy.

Tracing Japan's economic relations with Southeast Asia since the end of World War II, OKITA divided the period into four phases. The first phase hinged on reparations payments for damage done by the Japanese military during the war years. A reparations agreement was negotiated with Burma in 1954 and later agreements extended to most of the other nations of the area. Reparations were cash payments with no "strings" as to how the money was to be used.

The second stage in the relationship began in 1958 and was characterized by Japanese Government yen loans. The first loan was to India, to help her import from Japan as well as export to Japan. The main consideration was the needs of Japanese industry.

The third stage began in 1965-66 when a conscious effort was made by the Japanese government to give priority consideration to East and Southeast Asia. Japan recognized that it was the overwhelming economic power in that area and its import-export actions would have a significant effect on the economies of its neighbors. Economic agreements were reached at this time with Taiwan and South Korea. A major thrust was the establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), backed by Japanese and Western nations' financing and, for reasons of policy sited in Manila.

The fourth and present stage started in 1969. Japan is now one of the foremost industrial societies in the world, with a very favorable balance of trade and a gross national product (GNP) surpassed only by that of the U.S. and the USSR. At the Fourth Southeast Asian Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Bangkok in 1969, Japan's foreign minister said that since the GNP "might well reach the level of $500 billion by 1980," the "magnitude of economic cooperation which will then be extended from Japan will be such as to exceed levels that we can conceive of" At the Sydney meeting of the ADB and at the 25th ECAFE General Assembly in Singapore later in 1969, Japanese government leaders spoke of doubling aid to the region in the next five years. OKITA cautioned, however, that "aid policies must be governed by the need to meet the requirements and the stage of development prevailing in each recipient country with an aid pattern appropriate to these conditions."

In the present period OKITA sees the problems facing Southeast Asia as: 1) the impact of the ending of the Vietnam War on their economies, 2) the "green revolution"—development of new, more productive strains of rice—which carries with it the need for modernization of agriculture through water control and the use of fertilizers and pesticides, 3) choosing which industries to develop with their meager capital resources and 4) and most pressing, the tremendous increase in population and the need for family planning. In solving these problems, he sees aid from Japan as essential. An aid suggestion OKITA put forth is to use the Ryukyus (about to be returned to Japan by the U.S.) as a research center, particularly in the fields of natural science and engineering, to consider problems common to those islands and other parts of Asia.

In October 1969 OKITA and Yuzuru Hanayama, OKITA’s junior colleague, presented a paper at the meeting of the World Law Fund on Economics and World Order: 1990-2000, projecting Japan's economic growth and the economic development of Asia. They predicated their analysis on a Japanese per capita income in the year 2000 of US$6,156 (in constant 1965 dollars), compared to the per capita income in 1968 of US$1,110. They concluded that since Japan's need to import foodstuffs, textiles and energy resources would increase tenfold, Japan must change from an export to an import conscious nation. The relative importance of her trade with Asia might decline, but the actual importance would be immeasurably increased. Trade with some Southeast Asian nations would be more than half their national total. Essential to Japanese survival, they stated, would be uninterrupted world trade, and a co-imperative would be world peace.

Japan by this time would have moved away from labor-intensive industries and would be importing such items as textiles and partly processed raw materials such as lumber. Japan should therefore help establish these industries in the developing nations of Southeast Asia through both government loans and private investment. Government aid, they thought, should be given through multination organizations—such as ECAFE and the ADB—to make it more palatable. Japan could be most helpful to developing countries by offering technical assistance because, unlike the already industrialized West, Japan has had to overcome problems of poverty, overpopulation and underdevelopment similar to theirs. Japan has accomplished this, they pointed out, "with the mechanism of the free market rather than through centralized control as in the Communist World."

In February 1971 OKITA accepted a concurrent position as President of the International Development Center of Japan. Established in accord with the "Second Development Decade" of the United Nations, the Center's purpose is "to assist in development planning and undertake related studies for the developing countries." The Proposal for Establishment describes it as a "nonprofit organization consisting of distinguished scholars and specialists concerned with the problems of international development." As a catalyst for involving existing Japanese government agencies and private firms, it is expected to "play a pivotal role in generation and formulation of comprehensive and project-oriented plans for (international) development." It is primarily concerned with social and economic aspects, aspects often ignored in the crucial initial stages of development planning. Supplementing it on the technical side are the Institute of Development Economics, the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency and Engineer Consulting Firms, Associated. Universities and research institutions are expected to collaborate with it.

Specific functions of the Center are to: 1) coordinate projects too large for one firm, 2) research projects on its own or at the request of developing countries or development organizations, 3) maintain contacts with international organizations and act as a depository of current information, 4) train internationally oriented planners and economists, 5) publish a journal and occasional papers and 6) translate relevant developmental information not otherwise available. It is to be financed from both public and private sources and will charge fees for its services. To date the Center is reviewing past and future Southeast Asian regional transport plans at the request of the ADB, making economic feasibility studies of infrastructural development, and examining how Japan trains its intermediate level manpower to determine whether such training is applicable elsewhere.

In the minds of Asian planners, as well as in the minds of his own countrymen, OKITA was the logical choice to lead the Center. In the words of an observer at the Asian Development Bank, OKITA has been "a major contributor of policy in the field of Japan's postwar economic rehabilitation, Japan's economic growth strategy, and Japan's economic aid program" and he has been "one of the most influential economists in Japan in terms of shaping Japanese attitudes toward the outside world in the field of economic development. . . ." Another commented that "the Ministries, including the Prime Minister, call on him to make trips to Southeast Asia to report on the economic picture of said countries."

As early as the mid-1950s OKITA was encouraging studies to see if Indian and Japanese economic development could be meshed in order to complement one another. He recommended the Japanese method of rice cultivation (an intensive method that predated the "green revolution") be adopted by India, and he encouraged Japanese participation in joint fishery ventures in Southeast Asia and the offering of technical assistance in that field.

He pointed out the difficulties that lie ahead if each developing nation seeks self-sufficiency for political reasons, instead of seeking economic cooperation with one another for developmental and economic reasons. To support regional planning he believes that the ADB should give regional cooperative projects priority funding.

Of utmost importance to all these nations, he has admonished, is increased agricultural productivity, not only in order to feed their people and to save foreign exchange currently spent on food imports, but because "agriculture must produce a surplus to finance the accumulation of capital in industry, and at the same time agricultural districts must provide markets for industrial products." If a nation concentrates on industry at the expense of agriculture, the result is inflation and a stagnating or even lowered standard of living.

He warned that developing nations must, however, provide transportation to enable "the village economy to cast off its old shell of self-sufficiency, enlarge the market for its goods and increase gains from the division of labor." It must do it effectively using surplus labor. He also advised the developing nations to start industrial expansion with light (consumer) industry and thereby create a trained labor force before attempting heavy industry. Japan, he pointed out, had developed light industry before World War II. During and after the war heavy industry was built on that base.

Summing up, he suggested that government policy should emphasize investment in areas and techniques that economize on capital, maximize employment and progress from simpler techniques to more complicated ones.

OKITA has noted that the ECAFE area is vast and that perhaps subregional groupings make sense. Liberalization of trade within the area, he feels, would not necessarily make for more effective allocation of resources as in highly advanced countries like those forming the European Common Market, but aid-giving nations should require of aid-receiving nations coordinated economic development plans like those required by the U.S. under the Marshall Plan.

OKITA believes that in developing nations the private sector and the public sector need to be balanced, with an equal share of the country's managerial brains in each. The public sector should assist the private sector, particularly in marketing. Governments should have a clear-cut policy to protect infant industries but for a limited and stated period of time only.

OKITA sits on a government committee in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry which is looking at "how to move toward the future." It sees Japan moving from a savings-shortage to a savings-surplus nation and, therefore, to a capital exporting state. Future emphasis, he feels, will be on investment—the flow of capital rather than the flow of commodities. In discussing the methods of investing in the future, whether simple technical assistance at fixed interest rates, joint ventures or turnkey operations, OKITA has said, "we should work out a formula which can survive harmoniously with local nationalistic sentiments and national interests of host countries." He has advised the Japanese government to adhere to the international agreement reached by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to "un-tie" government loans to the developing countries, i.e., permit them to buy on the world market instead of from the lending nation.

Over the years SABURO OKITA has served his government on many other public boards and councils. He has been a Member of the Capital Region Redevelopment Commission and the External Economic Cooperation Council in the Prime Minister's Office, the Land Use and Housing Council in the Ministry of Construction, and the Industrial Policy Council at the MITI, as well as Adviser to the Science and Techniques Agency and the Institute of Development Economies. He has also served on the Government Planning Board of International Chemical Industries, as Lecturer in Economic Forecast, and as consultant for various scientific organizations and economic publications.

OKITA has been equally active in the international sphere, serving as his country's delegate on a number of international commissions. He has been a Standing Member in the UN Committee for Development Planning; Adviser to the OECD, Paris, 1964-66; Member of the Commission on International Development (Pearson Commission), World Bank, 1968-69; the High-level Expert Group on Science Policy in the 1970s, OECD, 1969, and the Advisory Group for the Study of Southeast Asian Economy in 1970s, ADB, 1969-70. In these capacities he helped author the report of the Pearson Commission, "Partners in Development," and the ADB study, "Southeast Asia's Economy in the 1970s."

He has also been his government's choice since the early 1950s to represent it at numerous international conferences. He has attended ECAFE and Colombo Plan meetings during the last two decades, "in which two organizations," a colleague has written, "he has done excellent work." The Far Eastern Economic Review took note of his contributions in 1962 when it wrote that he had recently become "one of the 'three wise men' of Asia when, along with a Thai economist Luang Thavin and Mr. K. B. Lall of India, he drafted the report to the ECAFE secretariat on the prospects for regional economic co-operation in Asia and the Far East." In 1955 OKITA attended the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, a major "Third World" meeting; and in the mid-1960s he toured the Middle East at the request of the Foreign Office.

In 1970 OKITA was invited to attend two disparate conferences in Latin America: he was asked as a "foreign expert" to discuss with the secretariat of five Andean countries meeting at Lima, Peru, a joint policy for foreign investment and technology imports, and was asked by the University of Chile to participate in its symposium on "Latin America and the Pacific."

OKITA has also written extensively. Between 1948 and the present he has published 11 books in Japanese on Japanese economic policy and specific economic problems, and five books in English dealing with Japanese relationships with developing countries: Rehabilitation of Japan's Economy and Asia (1956), Japan and the Developing Nations (1965), Causes and Problems of Rapid Growth in Postwar Japan and Their Implications for Newly Developing Countries (1967), Japan in South and Southeast Asia (1968) and Essays in Japan and Asia (1970). Japan and the Developing Nations is a collection of speeches delivered by OKITA on his official tour of the Middle East. He has also written innumerable articles in both languages for political and economic journals.

Conservative of dress and mien, OKITA reads Buddhist philosophy for relaxation and to keep his perspective. His family consists of his wife, Hisako, three sons, aged 28, 25 and 23, and a daughter, 21. His wife travels with him on some of his foreign trips. Bilingual in Japanese and English, he is known as a "very frank and candid man and quite different from the typical Japanese bureaucrat" who seldom emerges from his "consensus group."

OKITA is widely recognized for his role in promoting international understanding, both by his own countrymen and by the international community with whom he deals. Hidezo Inaba, Director of the Institute for Research on National Economy says, "SABURO OKITA, in the long run, will be one of the best friends Asia will have." Echoing that sentiment, an Indian journalist of international repute has stated: "He is probably the only top ranking economist in Japan who for about two decades kept himself busy with the problems of the developing countries in Asia. His knowledge of the region's economy and commitment to its development have undoubtedly influenced Japan's attitude toward the region—he has been a one-man lobby for Asia in Japan."

August 1971
Manila

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