The 1986 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Journalism, Literature and Creative Communication Arts

BIOGRAPHY of Radio Veritas

Without RADIO VERITAS it is very unlikely that we would have succeeded [in overthrowing the government of Ferdinand Marcos because it was through RADIO VERITAS that we were able to summon our courage and unity.

General Fidel Ramos

Chief of Staff

New Armed Forces of the Philippines

Politicians from left to right, foreign observers and ordinary Philippine citizens have echoed General Ramos' assessment of RADIO VERITAS' decisive role in the February 1986 revolution that overturned a fraudulent election and toppled the 20-year rule of President Ferdinand Marcos. The story is one of courage and faithful reporting in the face of a rapacious and scandalous government, desperate to retain power, and now discredited throughout the world. But the modest beginnings of RADIO VER1TAS did not lead one to expect it to topple governments.

In 1949 the wholesale expulsion of foreign missionaries and the restrictions placed on religious worship in China following the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces left shortwave broadcasting the only means of communicating the Christian message to the Chinese mainland. Although broadcast signals of various Protestant denominations already reached much of the continent there was no Roman Catholic voice to Asia.

Rufino J. Santos, then archbishop of Manila and later cardinal, at a meeting in the Philippines of Southeast Asian bishops, proposed building a shortwave broadcasting station, and a resolution endorsing the proposal was passed. The Philippines was chosen as headquarters and transmitter site because it was predominantly Catholic, centrally located, with a democratic form of government, and one of the few Asian nations licensing privately-owned radio stations.

Convinced that such a facility would be a powerful force for Christianity, Santos proved tireless in his fundraising activities. He visited West Germany in August 1960 where he obtained the government's promise of financial assistance. He cleared the project with Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia the following month and then returned to Germany to seek Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's personal support. The chancellor instructed Santos to present the project to the Bundestag (lower house of parliament) for consideration as extraordinary aid to a developing country. The following year the Philippine Radio Educational and Information Center (PREIC) was established as a legal entity to manage a station, and in June 1961 Garcia authorized the Catholic University of Santo Tomas to transfer and assign to PREIC its franchise to construct, maintain and operate a radio broadcasting station in Manila.

One year later Cardinal Santos returned to Germany and secured that government's formal agreement to underwrite 75 percent of the project's cost by donating and installing the basic equipment. PREIC and the Manila archbishopric agreed to be responsible for the land, buildings and personnel.

The new station's broadcasting studios were located in Manila and Quezon City, and the receiving station in nearby Taytay, Rizal. A large tract of land for the transmission center was obtained 45 kilometers north of Manila in Malolos, Bulacan.

By May of 1966, technicians from the German electronics firm of Siemens and Halske began installing two 100 kilowatt Siemens transmitters at Malolos for the overseas shortwave broadcasts. A 100 kilowatt Telefunken transmitter already provided the power for the domestic medium wave broadcasts, but because government regulations restricted medium wave transmission to 50 kilowatts, RADIO VERITAS was forced to operate this facility at half strength. Even at 50 kilowatts, it could theoretically reach the length and breadth of the Philippine archipelago.

On April 11,1969 RADIO VERITAS went on the air from Quezon City on its medium wave and became one of 247 radio stations broadcasting throughout the Philippines. At the same time the shortwave band began beaming a test program to Asia. Quoting from St. Paul's Letter to the Philippians, RADIO VERITAS pledged to broadcast "everything that is true, everything that is noble, everything that is good and pure . . . . or: worthy of praise." Antonio Cardinal Samore represented Pope Paul VI at the inauguration ceremonies which were attended by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and other dignitaries.

The PREIC Board of Directors met the same day and elected Cardinal Santos chairman. Bishop Alain Van Gaver of Thailand, Bishop Francis Hsu of Hong Kong and Thomas Cardinal Cooray of Ceylon were chosen to advise the yet-to-be-fully activated Asian segment.

Father Rodrigo Guillermo, the first general manager, had to contend with an unprofessional and inexperienced staff and an inadequate budget. Consequently, he turned to foreign priests with radio backgrounds who, as consultants, ran the station in the early years. Fr. James Reuter served as program director.

Letters and in-country monitoring revealed that the reception of the test program in Asia was spotty, and technical adjustments and broadcast tests continued before scheduled programming began in early 1972.

When Guillermo left in 1971, two general managers—Fr. Nico Bautista and Msgr. Feliciano Santos—followed each other in quick succession. Their brief tenures marked a period of painful transition for both the overseas and domestic operations. Existence seemed the only real accomplishment, and other than the earlier studio visit by Pope Paul on November 20,1970, there was little in the early years to keep up the spirits of the staff.

Part of the problem may have been Cardinal Santos himself. His concern and attention to detail served the venture well in the establishment years, but critics fault his too-close scrutiny and his refusal to delegate responsibility for the uninspiring domestic programs and for the eventual collapse of overseas broadcasting. He was accused of disbursing too little money for Philippine programs, and misreading the willingness and ability of other Asian bishops to support the overseas broadcasts. As equipment parts wore out, he made no funds available for replacements. Soon one transmitter after another failed and the overseas operation went off the air completely.

In September 1973 the Apostolic Nuncio in the Philippines, Archbishop Bruno Torpigliani, called a meeting to discuss the possible revival of the station's shortwave broadcasting. Attending were Bishop Jesus J. Sison of Catholic Mass Media in the Philippines, Msgr. Santos, Fathers Reuter, Desautels and Delbaere, and Bishop Gerald Mongeau whom the Vatican appointed to oversee the rehabilitation. Subsequently, Delbaere conducted a technical survey which estimated that the rehabilitation of the facilities would cost US$1,535,000 and annual maintenance and programming would require US$500,000. Reuter

And Desautels visited Germany and secured sufficient funds from Missio, MISEREOR, and Aid to the Church in Need to restart the international broadcasting. At the April 1974 Federation of Asian Bishops' Conference General Assembly, each bishop agreed to support the overseas rations by assigning to RADIO VERITAS part of his yearly subsidy from Propagation of the Faith in Rome. In Manila, the newly appointed bishop, Jaime L. Sin, threw his full support behind the plan and the Bishops' Conference of the Philippines accepted responsibility for maintaining the domestic service.

Test shortwave broadcasts began again in May 1975. Based on the excellent results, regularly scheduled programs commenced the folio

year—in English, Indonesian and Thai. Language services, one after other, were added until today RADIO VERITAS broadcasts in 15 languages, including Vietnamese, Sinhala, Tamil, Telugu, Japanese, Burmese, Korean, Chinese, Bengali, Karen, Kachin and Urdu; Pilipino is used in domestic broadcasts. Its goal is 30 languages by 1990. To accommodate this increase in languages, and to reach all of Asia with a strong signal, PREIC in 1979 approved funding for a 250 kilowatt transmitter. Construction was started at Palauig, Zambales, in the coastal mountains Northwestern Luzon. The transmission target date was late 1986.

RADIO VERITAS seeks guidance from Asian bishops so that its content will be relevant to target countries in fulfilling its promise to be "an authentic voice of Asians speaking to their fellow Asians. Depending on bishops' advice and on letter feedback, its services stress news, human development or spiritual messages; in response to many rests, the Vietnamese service emphasizes evangelization. Where possible, programs are produced on tape in-country and shipped to the Philippines for transmission. Otherwise, the programs are produced in Manila. Language programs are prepared in the vernacular, not translated from scripts in English or other world languages, and are voiced by a native speaker; consequently they never have that "translated sound" common to much international broadcasting.

Internally, a strong signal carried the domestic service 17 hours each day to much of the Philippine archipelago, but its dull programming attracted few listeners. Classical music—ill suited for AM broadcasting and listeners—and spiritual messages dominated. News was ignored. For example, when a typhoon disrupted 41 of the 44 local radio stations, VERITAS, which had been spared, did not interrupt its broadcast the opera "Carmen"; it provided no public service information and ignored the mounting human and material toll. Stodgy management style also stifled creativity. A low rating of .002 in a 1974 survey was more proof than needed that fundamental changes were required.

That year Bishop Sison, Chairman of the Philippine Bishops' Commission on Mass Media, was appointed general manager. In 1976 he brought in professional media personnel—Fr. George Dion, a trained radio man, and Orly Punzalan, a veteran TV journalist—who rearranged programming priorities and appealed to a new and wider audience. Popular tunes replaced classical works as the music mainstay. Hard-sell religious messages gave way to short inspirational talks directed to all listeners, not just Roman Catholics. Movie and TV personalities, and even comedians, appeared in skits or short dramas. And a brief news service was introduced. VERITAS began a steady climb up the ratings charts.

This shift came in spite of President Marcos' September 21, 1972 martial law decree which placed strict controls on the print and broadcast media and limited freedom of expression. The deportation that year of a foreign priest for airing criticism of martial law measures, and the closing of two Catholic radio stations in 1976, gave proof that religious stations were not immune from government sanctions. Nevertheless under Fr. Ramirez, who became station manager in 1978, programming priorities were reorganized to reflect 30 percent news and public service, 20 percent entertainment and 50 percent religious inspirational programming. National and international news, which had long been neglected, was improved by the acquisition of Associated Press, Reuters and Agence France Press teletype machines. The news programming was looked upon not as a method of boosting ratings, but as a fulfillment of the pledge to "bring everything that is true" to its listeners. By 1978, RADIO VERITAS had become a top radio station.

The hazard of news reporting was felt when, in 1981, Fr. Ramirez was pressured to resign. He had been too vocal in his condemnation of Mayor Emiliano Caruncho who, with his henchmen, had mauled VERITAS photographer Adore Reyes during the local elections.

In early August 1983, rumors began circulating in Manila that one of Marcos' foremost political foes, former Senator Benigno Aquino, would return from his self-imposed exile in the United States. In 1977, Aquino had been convicted by a military court of murder and sentenced to "death by musketry. " His conviction had been unpopular and Marcos had never carried out the sentence but kept Aquino imprisoned at Fort Bonifacio. By 1980 it was apparent that Aquino needed major surgery. In view of public sentiment, Marcos, rather than risk Aquino's dying on

military operating table, allowed his old enemy to travel to the United States where he underwent heart bypass surgery. Instead of returning to the Philippines after his recovery as he had said he would, Aquino settled in Boston and began lecturing at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

To verify the truth of the 1983 rumors of Aquino's return, Macario Taña of RADIO VERITAS interviewed Aquino live via long distance phone. This was the first time in six years the Philippine public had heard the latter's voice. In the course of the conversation, Aquino vowed to return, Despite the threat of arrest on arrival, and swore: "only death will stop me." A second Taña phone call in which Aquino repeated his promise allowed a week later, but neither had much follow-up press coverage.

Although Aquino flew back to the Philippines on a false passport (as Marcial Bonifacio), he invited the press to accompany him, and his arrival date (August 21) and carrier (China Airlines Flight #811) were open secrets in both the Philippines and the United States. VERITAS overseas program manager, Harry Gasser, aware that the government would prohibit planeside reporting, planned alternative coverage. He stationed reporters—casually dressed to avoid detection by security personnel and armed with pocketsful of coins—near pay telephones inside the Manila International Airport terminal building, with orders relay any scraps of news they could pick up. He also positioned a "broadcast van outside the nearby Church of Our Lady of Perpetual Help where Aquino was scheduled to worship after his arrival. Gasser had allotted three hours for coverage of Aquino's return since Sunday was a traditionally slow news day.

The plane arrived at 1:10 p.m. A Philippine Constabulary officer and two other uniformed men boarded it and escorted Aquino down a side stairway to the tarmac before the other passengers exited through the telescoped tunnel to the main terminal for immigration formalities. Within seconds after arrival Aquino was dead—shot from behind. The VERITAS reporters neither saw the assassination nor heard the shot, but the news traveled through the terminal building like a bullet itself. The porters immediately phoned their Quezon City studios and, eleven minutes after the shot, VERITAS carefully qualifying its report, informed a shocked nation. The first piece of backup information came in a VERITAS airport interview with Ken Kashiwahara, brother-in-law of Aquino and one of several newsmen who had flown with him to Manila.

Throughout the rest of the day, VERlTAS reporters placed their small tape recorders to payphone mouthpieces to play back interviews

or reports. Later General Manager Bishop Teodoro Buhain—who had taken over from Sison in 1981—reflected on the generally inefficient Manila phone system and his own shaky switchboard and marveled at the near miraculous consistency of successful connections.

The station, as usual, relied that day on volunteer reporters to augment its meager staff. A stable of young men and women, carefully screened and tested, had long been contributing their time, equipment and even vehicles to assist the news teams. Paul de Guia Caguiat, a hotel waiter, covered the assassination story, rushing from one location to another in his own car which limped to gas stations between spells of overheating. (Hotel salary and tips provide Paul more than VERITAS can pay, but radio work supplies for him, as for the other volunteers, excitement and a sense of public service lacking in their daily routine.)

That afternoon, VERITAS announcers had the airwaves to themselves. Other stations, conditioned by martial law and Marcos’ rule by decree," waited until 5:15 p.m. when Major General Prospero Olivas, Philippine Constabulary Metro Communications chief, gave the official version of the assassination. But, for uncensored information, the public continued to turn to station DWRV 846 (RADIO VERITAS) which stayed on the air well past midnight, its normal sign-off time, to continue reporting reactions and developments.

The government's displeasure was soon evident. The following morning the National Telecommunications Commission requested DWRV's broadcast tapes, and by Wednesday a delegation from the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP, the association of radio and television stations for self-regulation) called on Bishop Buhain. Reverend Fred Magbanua, a Protestant minister from the Far East Broadcast Network, led the group and told Buhain that Information Minister Gregorio Cendaña suggested the call. "We come here as friends and colleagues. We recommend that you tone down your broadcasts," he said. "You are professionals," the bishop responded. "Please tell me how do I make operational your recommendation? Give me a bill of particulars. What is wrong? What is to be corrected?"

Don Lee, the KBP president, confided that they had asked Cendaña that question but received no answer. Buhain assured the delegation that VERITAS never incited people. On the contrary, during this tragedy, priests had shared the microphones with announcers; they were there to counsel coolness and advise reflection.

During the following weeks, RADIO VERITAS provided its audience information unavailable elsewhere about anti-government rallies, demonstrations and boycotts. At the same time, it urged caution and refuted wild rumors of impending coups d'etat, the restoration of martial law, or Marcos' death. The government made no further roach, but later RADIO VERITAS was to experience increased difficulties clearing imported spare parts.

Buhain, in a later review meeting, observed that RADIO VERITAS rage would be considered routine in normal times and asked his staff: "Did we just plain forget that we were not in a normal situation, or we deliberately forget? " Answering his own question he said: "I feel we decided to forget because we wanted to assert a basic human right: right of the people to be informed—correctly." Yet, this was not a decision taken casually. Buhain had received prior approval for VERITAS' plans from Cardinal Sin, the station's president and board chairman. The backing of the cardinal, the country's leading prelate, meant the support of the Catholic hierarchy, a matter of considerable political significance in the Philippines.

The tension of August, nevertheless, took its toll of Bishop Buhain. In his anxiety over government retaliation and staff welfare, he neglected his health. In late September he became ill with what he at first eyed was the flu. A week later, he was rushed to the hospital with massive internal bleeding which required a five-hour emergency operation and the replenishment of his entire blood supply. Later the chief surgeon confided: "You are the first patient I thought I would lose on operating table."

Public response to the assassination coverage boosted staff morale. People began stopping announcers on the street to thank them or comment on their reports. (One staffer described his previous work as act of faith because there was no confirmation anyone was listening.) Evidence of this new popularity was not limited to grateful sentiment. An appeal for funds—because the station in extending its coverage and air time for the story had exceeded its budget—netted one million pesos (around 70,000 US dollars). Even so, increased power cost necessitated shortening the transmission day to 10 hours.

Following the assassination, the government was plagued by student criticism, demonstrations and strikes. Armed clashes, especially, in areas of ongoing communist rebellion or Muslim separatist activities, were increasingly noted by the international media. Western democratic—especially American—confidence in Marcos' ability to control events weakened. Domestic and foreign pressure alike began to build for an early election to provide the government with a fresh mandate.

In early November 1985, Marcos, appearing on the American television news show "This Week with David Brinkley," surprised everyone, including his close advisers, by declaring his willingness to hold a "snap" election "right now." The alien venue of the announcement and the unprepared state of his political party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL, Organization of the New Society), suggested a rash and impetuous, rather than reasoned and calculated, decision, uncharacteristic of the 20-year president.

However, confident that the opposition, fractured by deep ideological divisions, had no chance, Marcos set the election for February 1986. A superstitious man, he picked the 7th, his lucky number, as the date. Coming so soon, it afforded the opposition scant opportunity to coalesce around a single leader. Nevertheless the anti-Marcos groups set aside differences and pledged support to Corazon Aquino, wife of the slain Marcos foe. For purposes of registration the United Democratic Organization (UNIDO) was the party affiliation used by the coalition, which was composed of UNIDO, plus the combined Pilipino Democratic Party and Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban). Because Aquino had no past political ambition or experience, Marcos scoffed at this housewife who "belonged in the bedroom." His derision soon turned to alarm, as Aquino surprised her male opponent by displaying rare political poise and outdrawing him at election rallies.

Buhain designated Punzalan, the director of the domestic programs, to coordinate the election policy and coverage of DWRV. The planning team agreed to maintain strict neutrality. RADIO VERITAS microphones were to be offered equally to Marcos and his running mate, ex-Foreign Minister Arturo Tolentino, as well as to Aquino and her vice presidential candidate, ex-Senator Salvador Laurel. Buhain and his staff understood that the KBL, which could intimidate other stations into blocking out UNIDO propaganda, would consider impartiality unfriendly. Yet they would not sacrifice credibility for fear of unknown retaliation.

Punzalan planned a balanced schedule of KBL and UNIDO interviews so the public would have a clear understanding of their differing approaches to the political issues. Opposition politicians accepted every invitation, but—with the prominent exception of Tolentino—KBL politicians, who had numerous other public outlets and didn't need the DWRV platform, excused themselves on various pretexts. To avoid the "opposition station" tag VERITAS announcers

attempted, without success, to interview KBL spokesmen in their own offices.

Because the vote count by the government's Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had become suspect, citizens in 1953 had formed the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) to monitor polling places and to report results as ballot boxes were opened publicly. In 1986, some 500,000 people volunteered to monitor the election and RADIO VERITAS advertised its intention to carry NAMFREL as well as COMELEC results around-the-clock until a victor was declared.

To insure an up-to-the-minute vote count, VERITAS parked its broadcast van at NAMFREL's Information Center in the Manila suburb of Greenhills. Results, clearly identified as NAMFREL figures, were aired as soon as received. Not broadcast, until independently confirmed or all reasonable doubt removed, were NAMFREL reports of election irregularities, e.g., multiple voting, ballot box stuffing or switching, missing voter lists, and intimidation of voters by goon squads.

A small team of volunteers, working with Fr. Reuter of the Federation of Catholic Broadcasters in the Philippines (FCBP,) was one of RADIO VERITAS' prime independent sources. So that his group could communicate local returns on a secure and dependable channel, Reuter, with a small Asia Foundation grant, purchased single-side band radios and assigned June Keithley, a volunteer and a prominent TV program host, as the FCBP-VERITAS liaison. Shorthanded, Punzalan later invited this experienced broadcaster to anchor his late night shift as well.

NAMFREL and COMELEC "quick count" results were expected within two or three days after the polls closed. When early NAMFREL results showed Aquino leading, the official COMELEC tally slowed. A COMELEC count awarding 25,000 votes to Marcos/Tolentino and none to Aquino/Laurel in one northern district invited international ridicule and put the entire tallying process in jeopardy. On February 9th, RADIO VERITAS broke the story of 30 young COMELEC computer operators quitting en masse because of vote rigging. Five days later, the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines issued a statement condemning "unparalleled fraudulence" and calling on Filipinos to take up a "non-violent struggle for justice."

Senator Richard Lugar, leader of an American observer team sent by President Ronald Reagan, publicly expressed doubts about the returns and suggested a new election. Meanwhile RADIO VERITAS continued the NAMFREL and COMELEC tallies as the Philippine people and the world listened. By this time the number of foreign correspondents had grown until eventually over 1,000 converged on Manila. Many sought out the RADIO VERlTAS staff for background briefings or to plead for more English-language newscasts as they depended on VERITAS for information. Foreign embassies made similar requests. The respected Far Eastern Economic Review called RADIO VERITAS: "The mainstay of information," and "a kind of protest through information on airwaves mostly controlled by the government."

On February 15, amid cries of foul from the opposition and skepticism by foreign—notably American—political observers, the KBL dominated National Assembly declared Marcos the winner. Nevertheless station DWRV continued coverage of the NAMFREL count which showed Marcos losing.

On February 22, one week later, two matters troubled Bishop Buhain as he ate an early Saturday night dinner: extended transmission time for NAMFREL must soon end for it strained his meager budget; and military intelligence was investigating RADIO VERITAS' treatment of the election and this could only mean trouble. His musings were interrupted by a message that Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Acting Army Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos had specifically asked RADIO VERITAS to cover a press conference hastily called for that evening.

Those listening to the DWRV broadcast of the press conference at 6:30 p.m. were astonished to hear Enrile say "I believe that the mandate of the people does not belong to President Marcos' regime. For a fact there have been some anomalies committed in the election . . . . Personally I believe that the president did not win this election. " Ramos, by his side, said earlier, "I am with Minister Enrile."

Cardinal Sin, speaking over RADIO VERITAS that night, urged the people to be calm and pray for a just and peaceful resolution to the crisis. He offered to mediate between the rebels and the president, but called on civilians to protect Camp Aguinaldo (headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and seat of the Ministry of Defense) and Camp Crame (across the road and headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, the national police agency and under the Armed Forces) where Enrile and Ramos were taking their stand with some 400 armed supporters. "I would be happy if you can show them solidarity and support," Sin said.

His plea struck a responsive chord in a nation tired of political assassinations, presidential corruption, fraudulent elections and rule by decree. Within hours, thousands gathered outside the camp gates. By Sunday night, their numbers had grown to over a million, forming a human barricade that the soldiers and tanks sent by Marcos refused to attack.

Inside Camp Crame a RADIO VERITAS vehicle equipped with VHF (very high frequency) became the rebels' radio link to the DWRV studio and through it to the nation. Fearful Marcos forces might silence this vital outlet, Enrile ordered one hundred soldiers to protect the studio. Neighbors had already blocked approach roads with cars, jeeps and a water tank to protect RADIO VERITAS because, as one person said, "it is the only station that's giving us the right information . . . if RADIO VERITAS is closed, the people won't know what's happening."

Buhain, although grateful for Enrile's protection, asked the soldiers to remain outside the compound and yield in the face of superior force: it is better to lose machines than people, he reasoned. "I am sorry, " the officer in charge replied, "I have my orders." Buhain then informed him of the Malolos transmission facility which in that case would also need protection, and was told that troops would be sent there shortly.

Consequently, the bishop informed those at the transmitter site not to be alarmed if soldiers entered their compound. A few hours later the Malolos guards welcomed 50 armed men wearing fatigue pants and yellow (Aquino's color) T-shirts.

It was soon evident, however, that their cordiality was misplaced. The newcomers quickly disarmed the VERITAS guards and systematically destroyed the five transmitters. The small 10 kilowatt transmitter—a gift from the Knights of Columbus of the U.S. and the Philippines—which did not look like the others and was not plugged in, was minimally damaged and later repaired.

However, at that time neither domestic nor overseas broadcasts could be beamed from Malolos. The Quezon City headquarters activated its 10 kilowatt emergency transmitter. The equipment, never meant to operate beyond a few hours, could reach only Luzon and only with a weak and fading signal. Nevertheless it lasted through the daylight hours of Sunday, a crucial time when Marcos, with a near monopoly of the broadcast media at his command, and the rebels with only VERITAS, traded claims and counterclaims. It was a tug-of-war between Marcos' transmitter strength on one side and RADIO VERITAS' credibility on the other. Credibility was the clear winner.

An ultimatum, received by DWRV from the government, to "Go off the air by 8:00 p.m. Sunday or be bombed!" proved irrelevant, for

by 6:30 p.m. the backup transmitter's frail signal quit altogether. Throughout the afternoon, Enrile and Buhain, anticipating this, had searched for an alternate station, safe from attack and willing to be "liberated." DWRJ, a government station managed by a reformist minded colonel, volunteered itself. By 10 p.m. Keithley and a handful of VERITAS' staff manned DWRJ, which had been rechristened DWRB, "Radio Bandido," to help avoid detection.

From late Sunday through Monday morning, Radio Bandido, with DWRV personnel connecting it with the outside world, was "the voice of the revolution." Keithley, who spent a sleepless night in front of the microphone, broadcast news relayed to her from the DWRV studio on an extension known only to a few. Her reports of new defections and swelling support encouraged the mass of civilians—transistor radios pressed to their ears—who were crowded around Camp Crame to stand fast. The tanks, ordered to bulldoze their way through the crowd and destroy the Crame revolutionary base, were unwilling to attack the base's first line of defense—nuns holding rosaries at arms' length. The people won this round and Ramos, in analyzing the event, made the now famous statement: "What is happening is not a coup d'etat but a people's revolution . . . . We are heavily dependent on people's power. "

Marcos, however, still controlled not only the tanks but the major television studios. On Monday morning Enrile ordered the "liberation" of Channel 4, run by Information Minister Gregorio Cendana as the government's propaganda voice. A contingent of soldiers guarding RADIO VERITAS was assigned the task and accompanied by VERITAS reporters. After a brief fight, the rebels secured the station and pulled the plug on a Malacanang press conference, cutting Marcos off in midsentence.

As Punzalan, a former Channel 4 announcer, and other members of the VERITAS staff were on the spot, they took over the microphones and at 1:30 p.m. announced "the first free broadcast on Channel 4." The loss of the station, a powerful psychological blow, probably sealed Marcos' fate.

At noon the following day Marcos was sworn in as president for six more years, but he fled that evening by U.S. army helicopter to Clark Air Base, 88 kilometers to the north, where a U.S. Air Force plane waited to take him and his family and close advisors to Guam and then to Hawaii. "People's power" had triumphed.

That same day, Corazon Aquino had also taken the oath of office.

The Philippines had a new and popular leader. RADIO VERITAS' role in the largely peaceful revolution was called "pivotal" by Malaya, an influential Manila daily. But the station itself, a casualty of the revolution, was silent, unable to report the noisy celebrations. Later Aquino awarded VERITAS the Presidential Citation, and Cardinal Sin presented it with the Catholic Mass Media Award for Public Service.

Repairs to Malolos' five damaged transmitters began immediately with parts borrowed from Fr. Delbaere's Mountain Province Broadcasting Station and from Voice of America. Ingenious fabrication and makeshift repairs by staff technicians put medium and shortwave signals back in operation, but at reduced power. The repairs were costly, over US$2,000,000, but the public responded generously in a day-long fund appeal on Channel 4 in mid-March, and, by April 1, VERITAS was again broadcasting.

The governing board decided not to rehabilitate Malolos completely but to use the funds it had solicited over the past several years from various Catholic organizations—Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (formerly the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith), Missio, MISEREOR, Church in Need and the U.S. Bishops Conference for expanding its facilities in Palauig, Zambales. One reason was that the new 250-kilowatt transmitter earmarked for Palauig had been transported to its planned site by the time of the revolution. After the destruction of the Malolos transmitters Buhain had refrained from contacting the Palauig installation about the equipment for fear of alerting Marcos forces to its existence and thereby inviting its destruction. As an added precaution, he had told the foreign technician sent out to supervise its installation to stay in his hotel until the revolution was over. Therefore the large transmitter for Palauig was intact and ready to be installed.

Although RADIO VERITAS' courageous stand during the four-day revolution received almost universal acclaim, Bishop Buhain was personally troubled by the ethical question of a Catholic news organization taking a political position. Striving at first to maintain impartiality, he had nevertheless given the DWRV microphones to Enrile and Ramos for political and military purposes when battlelines had hardened. If they had been deprived of the voice of DWRV to call upon fellow commanders or the public for support, Marcos might easily have isolated and destroyed their movement. And he had allowed June Keithley, a volunteer and an avowed and ardent Aquino supporter, to determine the reportage during the critical phase of the revolution.

However, he realized, events had forced the management of RADIO VERITAS to make decisions in haste. Defending himself and his staff Buhain later explained: "You didn't have the time to discern what was right; you just played it by ear . . . . We didn't want any bloodshed. The civilians were protecting the two groups of soldiers from And, I was happy. "

Punzalan saw the problem differently. He insists there was no political meddling because the questions were not political an assassination and a fraudulent election.

September 1986
Manila

REFERENCES:

Broadcasting the Truth in News. Leaflet. Radio Veritas. Undated.

Brunner, Paul, S.J. "Radio Veritas—The Station of Truth," Life Forum. Manila March 1984.

Buhain, Bishop Teodoro J. "Nurturing Responsible and Responsive Radio Broadcasting to Group Discussion. Transcript. Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation. Manila. September 3, 1986.

"Letter from Manila," Far Eastern Economic Review. Hong Kong. February 27, 1986.

"People's Power First Used by Ramos at EDSA Barricades," Malaya. Manila September 22, 1986.

Radio Veritas in Asia. Pamphlet. Radio Veritas. Undated.

"RV Transmitter Destroyed," Malaya. Manila. February 24, 1986.

Soriano, Marcelo B. The Unused Guns of the 4-Day EDSA Revolt. Quezon City, Philippines: Author. 1986.

"Telethon for Veritas Goes on Today on TV-4," Malaya. Manila. March 16, 1986.

"Transcript of Enrile, Ramos Press Meet," Malaya. Manila February 24, 1986.

Interviews with Bishop Teodoro Buhain, Executive Vice President and General Manager, and other persons acquainted with Radio Veritas.