The 1971 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Government Service

Djakarta, on the island of Java, lies 6° below the equator on the trade route between China, the West and the spice islands of the Indonesian archipelago. In the 16th century it was known as Sunda Kelapa, a port of the Sundanese Hindu kingdom of Padjadjaran. It was conquered by the Moslem Sultan of Bantam on June 22, 1527 who memorialized his feat by renaming it Djaya Karta (Accomplished Victory). The city celebrates this date as its founding.

Later razed and rebuilt by the Dutch, it was named Batavia, or in the local dialect, Betawi. After 350 years of Dutch rule and three and one half years of Japanese occupation during World War II, the country and city declared themselves independent on August 17, 1945. Four and a half years later, on December 27, 1949, international recognition was given to this old-new country of Indonesia, to Djakarta (later to be spelled Jakarta) as its capital and to Sukarno as its President.

ALI SADIKIN, destined to help Djakarta find itself in the post-independence era, was born on July 7, 1927 in Sumedang, West Java, in the 400-year anniversary of the founding of Djakarta. His parents were Sundanese of modest means, his father being a district agricultural extension officer.

During the Japanese occupation, young ALI was sent to Batavia to attend the Merchant Marine School, and immediately after graduation he served as instructor at the same school. In the struggle for independence that began as World War II ended, he joined with other young freedom fighters in the capital city the nationalists now called Djakarta to organize the Badan Keamanan Rakyat Laut, or the People's Sea Defense Front, which constituted the founding of the Indonesian Navy. After serving with the Front for several months, he was sent to Tegal, Central Java, to help organize the Fourth Naval District, which eventually chose that city as its headquarters site. In 1950, soon after independence was won, ALI SADIKIN was summoned to Surabaya Naval Base for Additional Officer Training.

Energetic, alert, dedicated, with the ability to identify with and inspire men, the young officer continued his upward rise as Commander of the Navy Barracks at Wonokitri in Surabaya, East Java, and as concurrent Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps. He was also a lecturer at the Naval Academy in Surabaya and military judge on the High Military Tribunal for Surabaya and Malang. In 1953 he was sent to the United States Marine Corps School in Quantico, Virginia, for advanced training. Returning, he was made Commander of the Marine Corps Training Center and concurrently Commandant of the Marine Forces. From 1959 to 1963, when he attracted the attention of then President Sukarno, he was Deputy to the Minister/Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Navy.

For his military service he was decorated with 26 medals and honors; among others the Guerrilla medal, medals for the First and Second Wars for Independence, medals for the First, Second, Fifth and Sixth Military Operations and for the Operation Against the Rebellion in the Celebes. He has received medals of the second order from the Indonesian Navy, Army, Airforce and Police. His government has bestowed upon him the Medal for Dharma for outstanding service and the Medal of Maha Putra, the highest recognition for a distinguished son of the nation. He has also been decorated by the governments of Ethiopia and the Netherlands.

In 1963 Sukarno, "who liked to surround himself with dramatic, dynamic types," appointed SADIKIN Minister of Sea Communications and concurrently Minister Coordinator for Maritime Affairs. SADIKIN served both president and country well.

The consensus of serious political observers is that Sukarno's most effective action in his last months before being forced from office was the appointment on April 28, 1966 of ALI SADIKIN as Governor of Djakarta. To this job 39-year old SADIKIN, already a Major General, brought the discipline and dedication of his military training; his ability to work with people, well tested in coping with critical problems during the Sukarno years; his obvious qualities of leadership honed through years of high command, and his humanity—which was to be the key to his approach to administering the dirty, sprawling city he had been ordered by Sukarno to "save."

Recounting his reaction to his appointment, he remarked later, "I thought I was not lucky. I knew the condition the city was in and I had no experience or education for it."

Djakarta was a city that must have seemed to him at first ungovernable. It had grown from a fairly sleepy colonial capital of 600,000 in 1941—not known even then for its sanitation or quality of life—to a congested, overgrown capital of a newly independent nation with a population of approximately 5,000,000 in 1966. Infrastructure and facilities needed to maintain the mushrooming urban population were not sufficiently provided during the Sukarno years, when politics and national prestige were major concerns and low priority was given to housing, jobs, electricity, water, transportation or various other necessities and amenities. In 1966 only 15 percent of the houses in the city had water or electricity. The proportion decreased in the next few years as the population continued to increase at the annual rate of over four percent, and priority had to be given to the replacement of water and sewer pipes already over 60 years old before new ones could be added to the system. The other 85 percent of the city was dependent on kerosene for lighting and on the canals and ditches for both water supply and sewerage.

Administratively there was the problem of divided responsibility, or "verticalism" and "dualism," between the central and local governments. Departments were duplicated in the two chains of command. Jealousy over power and perquisites resulted in little or nothing moving except the extent of the city's needs which grew steadily larger. Moreover, competition among the many military and paramilitary units in control of the city made administration even more difficult.

Within 10 months SADIKIN was to be confronted by yet another complication. He was a Marine general and a Sukarno appointee who found himself serving, after February 1967, under General Suharto and the victorious Army generals who had forced Sukarno to give up all executive authority.

When Sukarno appointed SADIKIN governor and told him to "save the city," SADIKIN set out to learn firsthand the problems of the people of the city he was to save. Incognito, he traveled the length and breadth of Djakarta, alone or with only an aide, on foot, by jeep, or on public transportation—of which there was pitifully little. He stood in the rain and tried to squeeze onto the overcrowded buses; he saw scalpers buy up the few tickets that were available. He ate at the roadside stalls and heard the complaints of the hawkers, the slum dwellers and the squatters. He "felt the hopelessness of hordes of children without shoes to wear to school, or schools in which to wear them." He watched people bathe and wash clothes in open sewers. "I try to understand the problems of the common people. I have no training so with me it is trying to know the problems, a little bit of common sense and feeling."

In the first six months in office he lost 15 pounds and much sleep, but he established his priorities. He would move to improve infrastructure, education and environment, in that order. Basic to his approach was concern that the development effort lead to a speedy economic acceleration through a management policy of implementing "proper distribution of income and thereby proper distribution of social participation and social responsibility. "

One of the first problems SADIKIN tackled was transportation. The city was almost at a traffic standstill because of deeply potholed roads, narrow streets and little public transportation. He filled in the potholes, resurfaced the streets, widened major thoroughfares, and persuaded foreign firms to build bridge overpasses and pedestrian shelters on the understanding that they could use their surfaces for advertising.

A fleet of 5OO American school buses were brought in under a United States AID program, and set-fares and a scheduled routing system were established. Two thousand more buses could have been used, but there were two deterrents: lack of funds and the recognition that betjak (pedicab) drivers were supporting upwards of 200,000 people on their earnings. In spite of the congestion pedicabs caused on the main streets, SADIKIN moved against them slowly. As one observer noted: "Humanity has been SADIKIN's strongest point. If he were the simple Marine officer many thought him to be . . . he would have used force frequently and tact rarely; he has authority to be as rough as he likes. But his every move has been marked by consideration for people." To increase pedestrian safety he strung kilometers of wire fencing between pedestrian walk areas and roadways.

During his first three years as governor, SADIKIN built 200 schools, more than had been built in the previous 20 years. The schools ran double shifts, with children going to school either in the mornings or afternoons, and teachers teaching one half of the day or the other; even so the city was still short 300,000 to 350,000 school seats.

Children were a constant worry to BANG ALI (ELDER BROTHER ALI)—as he became familiarly called by the people of the city. They watched him move among them and saw that his concern for them was real. "Children are my biggest problem—to give them food, clothes, shelter, and after fifteen years work . . . . they are depending on me. . . . But every year 170,000 new babies—three quarters of Bonn's population!"

He began building family planning clinics next to maternity hospitals in the hope that new mothers would use them, but population increase continued to plague him. By 1970 the population had reached 4,700,000, with an annual 2.8 percent natural increase and a 2.5 percent increase by immigration, mostly from the countryside. With official approval, on August 5th of that year SADIKIN declared Djakarta a "closed city": no one could enter the city to live unless he had a job and house waiting. Each immigrant was required to deposit a returnable sum with city authorities in case the job or housing failed to materialize.

Money was a major problem when BANG ALI took office and has remained so. In 1966 inflation in Indonesia was 600 percent. It was reduced over the next three years, by incredible effort, to 10 percent. The central government had little money to spare for the city, although it was headquartered in Djakarta and collected taxes from all its citizens. Djakarta still provides the national government with 40 percent of its tax revenues but gets back only enough to meet the municipal payroll and minimum routine expenses. In 1971, against a budget of 12 billion rupiahs (Rp. 340 then equaled US$1) only 3.3 billion (27 percent) were supplied by the central government. In contrast Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur received 85 percent of their budgets from the central government, and the budget of Bangkok then was more than twice that of Djakarta's for half as many people.

SADIKIN’s only choices were to increase municipal tax collections and find other tax sources. Imaginatively, he decided that gambling, which was primarily in the hands of gangsters, was a source of surplus money. In spite of the outcry from Muslim religious leaders that gambling is forbidden to Islam, he "localized" gambling, i.e., brought it under government supervision and control, and taxed the fruits of it heavily. Gambling, he announced, was for foreigners and the local Chinese (inveterate gamblers) and gambling taxes would be used to build schools. He declared that God would more readily forgive him for recognizing gambling than for allowing hundreds of thousands of children to grow up illiterate and unprepared to earn a living. He later set up a government lottery. In 1968 30 percent of the revenue of Djakarta came from taxes on gaming.

As another tax source, and to make Djakarta more attractive to tourists, he encouraged the establishment of nightclubs. When the religious leaders again protested, including some officials whom he knew were the first to visit such establishments in Hong Kong and Bangkok, he replied, "I can't turn five million Djakartans into angels. Some must go to hell," and pointed out again that the schools and roads were dependent upon such tax money.

SADIKIN’s budget goal is 60 percent for development and 40 percent for routine administrative outlay. In 1969/70 he achieved a ratio of 52 to 48 percent, and in 1970/71 came nearer his goal with 58 to 42. There was no money for public housing, however. "Nothing in the present national priorities will allow import of materials in a subsidized manner. Without such aid, I could not build anything cheap enough for people to rent."

From the first BANG ALI recognized that he must be both a community leader and an administrator. As a leader he must raise the people's sights and help them develop a sense of confidence in the future. By cleaning up the streets, establishing a dependable transportation system, building schools and beginning the tremendous job of getting running water and electricity to the 85 percent of the population without them, he gave the people hope. As one Djakarta editor said, "For the first time, people on the city feel someone cares about them."

As an administrator he recognized he must first "establish priorities, channels, and procedures and assert his own authority. . . . " The first necessity was unification of the governmental structure. His Order of Unification of June 22, 1966 was a follow-up of the Dwikora Cabinet decision of June 1965 which had recognized the weakness of dual central and local administrative channels. His hand was strengthened the following year when Suharto, by Presidential Instruction No. 15, recognized the governor as the single authority in Daerah Chusus Ibukota Djakarta (Special Region of the Capital City Djakarta, referred to as DCI Djakarta) as the city had been designated since 1961.

The governor is the sole administrative authority, responsible only to the president, and with the twofold function of carrying out presidential policy and making regional (municipal) decisions. He has four deputies. He cooperates with an elected Municipal Council composed of 40 members which assists him in making political decisions, a Planning Board, and the DCI Djakarta Administration Secretariat which functions as a general staff and makes judgmental and technical decisions. The Secretariat is composed of the heads of the six directorates into which the city government is organized (local government affairs, security and order, public welfare, development, economic affairs, and finance), and the heads of the five bureaus (city council, regional administration, administrative affairs, personnel, and legislation).

In "line positions" are the heads of the various physical areas of the DCI. On August 9, 1966 Djakarta was divided into: five townships, each under a mayor who is a technical person appointed by the governor; 27 sub-districts consisting of 200,000 persons and under a divisional officer, and 220 "village" units of around 30,000 people under a village leader. At the bottom are the neighborhood organizations of 40 to 50 family units. These officers are in relationship to the governor and the secretariat as line officers are to the commanding officer and the general staff in the Marine Corps. Power is decentralized, with the headman at the lowest level being "responsible for knowing everything that goes on in the neighborhood and for carrying out government orders and organizing various neighborhood activities." The next level up is responsible for "such matters as local security and sanitation and the distribution of subsidized rice, cooking oil and textiles." This policy of administration seeks to insure "greater participation of the communities in development activities and encourages cooperation between the government and the communities. Furthermore, the Governor is freed from the daily routine activities of administration."

The arrangement has also been likened to a modern business, "with every employee as well as resident in the city as a 'shareholder' having a stake in it and doing his own share of the responsibilities. It is an arrangement of reciprocity, where each member gives and receives."

Djakarta has operated since 1967 under three development plans. The Three-Year Rehabilitation Plan was instituted for the years 1967-1969 and was to coordinate activities "both from the central and local governments, private and public sectors, with a corresponding proposed budget for every activity. The development covers the physical; spiritual, social, administrative and economic needs of the community." Major projects were building and improving roads, public buildings, transportation facilities, schools and clinics. The Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita) is an extension of the Three-Year Plan and extends from 1969 through 1974. It includes ongoing projects of the Three-Year Plan and a total of "278 local projects to be financed by the local government and 99 central government projects."

Over and above these more limited plans is the Twenty-Year Plan, or the Master Plan, which was decreed by the Municipal Legislative Council in 1967, but was backdated to cover the period 1965-1985. The Master Plan aims at making Djakarta capable of fulfilling its functions as a capital, a commercial and industrial city, and a cultural and tourist city, and of providing employment and raising the standard of living of 80 percent of its people. Reporting to the Council at the completion of his first five-year term in office, SADIKIN commented that one-fourth of the time period of the Master Plan had passed and that the government to date had been only "laying cornerstones for further development activities." Cooperation had been established between the executive and the legislative branches and the military, a condition important to stepping up services to the community and in helping develop Djakarta as a national capital and international entrepôt.

In his report SADIKIN broke down the Master Plan into major categories and discussed plans or progress in each field. Under Administration Apparatus and Affairs he announced that Rp.39 million had been allocated to improve personnel skills; development programs had been synchronized with national development programs; agencies had been set up which included housing, fire-control, sanitation, tourism, town planning, industrial affairs and investment; a standardized work directory was produced; work rooms were modernized; plans were prepared for the construction of public buildings at all levels of the DCI structure, and modest residences were built for senior officers in the municipal government.

Special attention was paid to the development of administrative resources at the township level and lower. One hundred seventy-eight village, 15 sub-district and 3 township office buildings, he announced, were completed or nearing completion. Telecommunication links had been established between security and administrative units and surveys had been made concerning transportation needs, village improvements, property rights and income assessments. An anti-illiteracy campaign was undertaken and public library units built. Voluntary mutual aid activities were supported administratively and financially. Eighty police stations and seven military command stations were established and 133 motor cars and boats were purchased for the security forces. Rp.163 million were spent on fire control projects, fire stations, cars and a VHF radio unit.

In the field of Social Welfare 216 mosques, 371 prayer houses, 5 churches, 263 Islamic religious schools and 171 primary Islamic schools were renovated. In the secular field 347 primary schools, 113 junior and senior secondary schools and vocational and training schools were established or rehabilitated. The DCI is responsible only for primary education but SADIKIN has aided secondary education as well since little was being done by the central government.

A major cultural and recreation center, Taman Ismail Marzuki, was built and the zoo was relocated on an appropriate large suburban site. Youth centers, museums, scientific institutes, a race course, 14 basketball and volleyball courts, 8 soccer fields, 4 swimming pools and 4 sports halls were constructed, as a result of which ALI SADIKIN received an award "for the Promotion of Sports in Indonesia." Aid was given to 4 public hospitals, 19 community health centers were established and services were provided to 50,000 family planning acceptors.

Infrastructure was another major sector dealt with in the Master Plan. SADIKIN reported a total of 1,312 kilometers of roads, 45 bridges, 7 bus terminals, 390 bus shelters and 15 overhead bridges have been built, and 1,099 buses bought. His administration also concerned itself with road lighting, construction and rehabilitation of 23.4 kilometers of sewage canals and floodgates, laying water pumps and pipelines, and building windmills. Effort was made to improve public hygiene by increasing the number of refuse collection trucks and refuse bins, and a beautification program was begun, first by simply cleaning up the streets and parks, and then by planting greenery along 50 kilometers of roads and laying out 13 hectares of parks.

With administration and encouragement, trade grew between 1966 and 1970 from approximately 15,500 million rupiahs to 133 million, banking from 1,324 million to 10,700, and industry from 2,223 million to 21,100. Seventeen tourist hotels were operating by the end of 1970 and 37 more were under construction. Bars, nightclubs and restaurants to attract foreign tourists were being built. Per capita income increased during these same years from Rp.6,224 to 47,141, and SADIKIN estimates that 98,600 new job opportunities will develop during the next four years.

DCI expenses increased from approximately 1.2 billion rupiahs in 1966 to 13.4 billion in 1971/72 and the central government has yet to help substantially. An important administrative reform has been that the budget must be drawn up before the year in which it goes into effect.

The city has been attempting to render services to economic projects of both private and public nature. It has increased market facilities by making available to the central government 17 hectares of land for market construction and has itself built a central market. Pilot cooperative projects have been encouraged, especially credit cooperatives. Small-scale industry was abetted by training 2,000 persons in manufacturing household articles and by making industrial surveys.

A certain amount of farmland and forest falls within DCI Djakarta. Thus in the sectors of agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry, seed stations, rice-barns, and an agricultural training center were established; vegetable cultivation was intensified, 18,600 fruit trees were "rejuvenated" and 2,000 clove trees were planted. Two veterinarian laboratory units, an artificial insemination center for pigs and an abattoir were constructed. Coastal forests were rehabilitated and expanded and seven forestry inspection posts and two nature reserves established.

Both inland and sea fishery projects were encouraged and attempts were made to upgrade equipment and marketing facilities. A breeding station of 54 hectares was established for a fresh water fish species (bandeng), a survey made, and an experimental station for breeding ornamental fish begun.

Delivery of this progress report coincided with the official celebration of the 444th anniversary of the founding of Djakarta. A celebration of the event was instigated by SADIKIN in 1969 to add some color and fun to the generally drab lot of the citizens. The festivities included firework displays, street dancing, parades and, in this electricity-shore city, all-night lighting.

BANG ALI is the first to recognize that "leadership cannot work only with charisma; the leader has to be one who is ready to work." Nevertheless, combined with his seemingly infinite capacity for work, Governor SADIKIN has an immense amount of that other quality, and a feel for the emotional as well as the physical needs of his people. He has a winning way with crowds, can quickly adapt his words to their moods and, as one observer noted, is "out dancing and laughing with his citizens on the occasion of any festival or celebration." Another reporter commented: "He has the gift of projecting his own personality upon his chosen audience and of establishing that electrical contact which signifies almost a mystical rapport." He is "skilled in histrionics, with flashing eyes, mobile features, a mellifluous voice and total self-possession."

However, he has a quick temper and his flashes of anger fall on the mighty and lowly alike. He has shouted at aides in public and the Minister of Education and the Minister of Religion have both felt his ire: the Minister of Religion because he refused to help the Djakarta government build a hotel for Indonesians leaving on pilgrimage to Mecca, the Education Minister because the department failed to staff some of the schools he had built with such effort. "I can become angry easily because I am frank," he says, and in an open letter to the people of Djakarta in 1970 he asked their forgiveness for his outbursts of temper. "It's only from his mouth, not from his heart," one of his staff explains.

His anger is usually channeled productively. When he learned that pickpockets were infesting his new bus terminal, he personally swooped down and rounded them up. "They were young boys about 20. I lined them up, smacked some faces, put them in military barracks for two days, then we met at City Hall. I talked. They cried. They could not get work. I gave them work."

He treated the city's 30,000 employees the same way. He disciplined, threatened and cajoled them into showing up for work—more or less on time—and eliminated bribery, but tried to meet the payroll on time. When acquainted with the plight of the retired civil servants, he doubled their inflation-eroded pensions.

SADIKIN’s day starts at 6:30 a.m. with breakfast with his wife, Nani, who is a practicing dentist. As he puts it, he supports his wife and four sons on his government salary three days a week; she supports them all the other four days. His aide and private secretary join them in their state-provided villa (he refuses to live in the governor's palace). He scans 15 newspapers during breakfast and looks over the news agency reports as he is driven to the City Hall in his government-provided Land Rover—a vehicle which has become a status symbol in today's Djakarta. The newspapers, SADIKIN says, tell him things his aides are either unaware of or don't wish to tell him. He calls the press his "unpaid workers."

Arriving at City Hall he summons department heads to his operations room—which is large and well-furnished, with slide panels of maps of Djakarta, charts of statistics, 20 microphones, slide and movie projectors and a soundproof studio—to discuss their problems and plans with the other department heads. "Frequently he interrupts with queries, comments, demands for more effective action," one of them reports. Then he is off to survey the city's trouble spots. "Sometimes he rides incognito in a Fiat for surprise appraisals of various projects. To it all he brings a military addiction to order."

Perhaps ALI SADIKIN’s most important contributions have been cutting through governmental inertia, inefficiency and red tape and eliminating bribery. He did this primarily by exhortation and by changing the governmental structure to make efficiency possible.

Kenneth Watts of the United Nations Center for Housing, Building and Planning was asked by SADIKIN to write down his impressions of Djakarta on his return to the city in 1971 after a 12 to 15 year absence. Watts wrote:

"I would wish to express, at the outset, my admiration to you and your officers for the very real efforts which have been, and are being taken to upgrade Djakarta. I would not say this if I were merely to use the evidence of construction along Djl. Thamrin and in the big squares: the test, for me, of this new spirit is to be found in the Kampongs (villages) where you are upgrading the physical environment m a systematic way, and building new schools, polyclinics and other public facilities. The theme which I shall attempt to develop is that development is a total process, involving social, physical as well as economic change; and in this respect, I believe that your approach to the problems of city development in Djakarta is right."

Mochtar Lubis, noted Indonesian journalist and a 1958 Ramon Magsaysay Awardee who was recognized "for his courageous and constructive contribution to journalism as a power for the public good," commented a year earlier: "What is more important. . . . is not SADIKIN’s tangible achievements but another, bigger, intangible thing: he has shown that by responsible dedicated leadership Indonesians can help themselves. He has achieved so much to improve life in Djakarta, not by getting foreign aid but by using his imagination and leadership. In doing so, he has inspired people to work hard for the public good. He has instilled a new sense of self-confidence into them and their future."

Perhaps the last word should be given to his wife who says: "The Governor is a man who can take 10 steps while others take one. And each seep he takes leads Djakarta's citizens coward a better life."

January 1972
Manila

REFERENCES:

''Asia—Where the Action Is," Time. July 19, 1971.

Barton, John F. "Indonesian Economic Recovery a Model for Others to Follow," New Nation. Singapore. April 10, 1971.

"Big-mouthed Ali," Harian Kami. Djakarta. April 3, 1971.

DCI Djakarta Brochures:

Development of Djakarta in Brief. N.d. 33 p.

Dinas Peternakan Keshatan Hewan (Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services). (In Indonesian.) 1970.

Djakarta Dari Abad Ke Abad (Djakarta from Age to Age). (In Indonesian.) N.d.

Djakarta, the Gateway to Cultural Paradise. Tourist Development Board. M.M. 085/1969.

Djakarta Investment Office. N.d.

Djakarta, Its Rehabilitation Development. N.d., 26 p.

Djakarta Offers Project Antjol to the Investor. M.M. 065/1969.

Djakarta, The Rising Metropolis. Tourist Development Board. N.d.

Djakarta Visitors' Guide Map. Ibid. N.d.

Ibukota Djakarta Milik Bangsa Indonesia Hut 442 (Djakarta—The National Heritage of Indonesia, 442nd Anniversary). (In Indonesian.) June 22, 1969.

Masalah Sosial (Social Welfare Services). (In Indonesian.) N.d.

Mesdjid Makna Dan Fungsingja (The Mosque—Its Nature and Function). (In Indonesian.) Dept. of Religion for the Djakarta Fair. 1970.

Museum Dalam Pelita DCI Djakarta (The Museum of DCI Djakarta) (In Indonesian.) N.d.

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Pembangunan Dan Pengembangan Bidang Perikanan Darat (The Establishment and Development of Fresh Water Fisheries). (In Indonesian.) Fresh Water Fisheries Service. 1970.

Pembinaandan Pengembaraan Perekonomian Melalui Registrasi Perusahaan 1968/69 (Maintenance and Development of the Economy Through the Registration of Establishments by the Executive Body, 1968/69). (In Indonesian.) M.M. 088/1969.

Pemerintah Daerah Chusus Ibukota Djakarta (Special Region of the Capital Djakarta). (In Indonesian.) Real Estate and Construction Corporation. N.d.

Pengamalan Sila Pertama Pantjasila (The First of the Five Rules). (In Indonesian.) 1970.

Perumahan Pegawai DCI (Housing for Djakarta Officials). (In Indonesian.) N.d.

Pro Bandjir Djaya (Anti-Flood Measures in Djakarta). (In Indonesian.) 1970.

Pusdiklatnil Peremintah DCI Djakarta (The Education and Training of Administrative Personnel of the DCI Djakarta). (In Indonesian.) 1970.

Repelita DCI Djakarta (Five-Year Plan of the Special Region of Djakarta). (In Indonesian.) N d.

Shalat dan Batjaannja (Prayer and Its Execution). (In Indonesian.) N.d.

Tanja Djawab Tentang IUD (Questions and Answers on the IUD). (In Indonesian.) N.d.

"Djakarta's Taxes of Sin," The Asian. Hong Kong. November 7-13, 1971.

Foisie, Jack. "Djakarta Thrives Under Popular Governor: Sadikin Keeps City Lively and Improves Economy," Los Angeles Times. Extract. N.d.

Galloway,Joseph. "Djakarta—A Spicy City," UPI dispatch. Djakarta. 1968.

______. "Unorthodox Mayor of Unorthodox City," UPI dispatch. Djakarta. 1968.

Hanna, Willard A. Pak Dikin's Djakarta Part I: Change and Chance in a Stricken City. American Universities Field Staff, South East Asia Series. Vol. XVII, no. 1 (Indonesia), lOp.

______. Pak Dikin's Djakarta Part II: Exhibit of Urban Figures. Op. cit., no. 2 (Indonesia), 12 p.

Hughes, John. "How Jakarta Was Transformed," Christian Science Monitor. Boston, Mass. December 31, 1969.

Lescaze, Lee. "Djakarta Battles Overcrowding, Poverty," Washington Post. October 26, 1970.

Lubis, Mochtar. "Djakarta's Swinging Governor," Asia Magazine. Hong Kong. Vol. 9, no. 2. January 12, 1969.

Mabbet, Hugh. "Humanity is keynote of Jakarta's no nonsense governor: Sadikin, the tough town tamer's thankless task," Straits Times. Singapore, November 29, 1970.

"On Nightclubs and Hostesses," (Editorial), Abadi, Djakarta. January 8, 1971.

Saar, John. "An Honest Marine Rescues Djakarta," Life Magazine. February 2, 1970 .

Sadikin, Ali. "The Administration of the Djakarta Special Capital City Region." Presensation made to Group Discussion. Transcript. Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation, Manila. December 14, 1971.

______. Letter to Belen H. Abreu. August 31, 1971.

______. "444th Djakarta Anniversary Address at the 22nd June 1971 Special Plenary Session of the Regional Legislative Council (DPRD-GR)."

Tulaar, Thory. "I Saw What Was Needed," Horizons. Manila: U.S. Information Agency. Vol. 18, no. 5. 1969.

Watts, Kenneth. Report to Mr. Ali Sadikin, Governor of Djakarta-Raya (DCI) on the Future Development of Djakarta. February 18, 1971.

Letters from and interviews with persons familiar with Ali Sadikin and his work. Observation visits to Djakarta.